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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
What do citizens think about their governments
militarizing public security? While scholars
maintain
that
current
militarism
and
militarization macro trends jeopardize the
already fragile state of democracy worldwide,1
less research exists on people’s opinions
on the constabularization of the military,
whether they support it, and, if so, under what
conditions. While the effects of militarism and
the militarization of security are evident in the
Americas, most notably transmitted via images
of soldiers complementing and replacing law
enforcement agencies at times of social crisis,
this report seeks potential answers to what this
means in theory and practice.
The paper provides officers and officials with an
interpretation of militarism and militarization as
two crucial concepts to understand the current
strategic arena in the Western Hemisphere.
Here, examples abound, from positively
encouraging U.S. military partners in the region
to integrate policies with feminist perspectives
– a clear signal toward the shift in gender roles
of the armed forces – to the less rewarding ironfist use of the whole-of-military participation in
non-traditional roles that have led to human
rights abuses and increased societal turbulence.
To map the relationships between citizens and
the state of militarism and militarization in
Latin America and the Caribbean,2 the report
uses empirical evidence to identify critical
issues that might explain militarism and
militarization experiences, including whether
the police or military interfere with the private
lives of individuals and the extent to which
the chief executive is threatened by military
force. It seeks to explain factors contributing
to the constabularization of the military3 by
questioning citizens’ satisfaction with the
police and the judiciary.
The report also reviews theories of support
for the militarization of security and asks
whether this support is linked to measures
of liberal democracy, the rule of law, state
fragility, military expenditure, and active-duty
military personnel. Finally, it analyzes a set of
determinants of public support for militarization
in more detail, presenting the case studies of
Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay.

The results show that citizens supporting their
national armed forces’ collaboration with the
United States in security issues also support
militarizing public security. The idea that people
are willing to welcome U.S. military collaboration
might be a crucial policy determinant
considering the central component of “building
partnerships,” as stated in SOUTHCOM’s
strategy, Enduring Promise for the Americas.4
The paper has two main sections. First, it
unpacks an up-to-date understanding of
militarism and militarization, aiming to feed
academic and policy debates. Having a greater
perspective on what citizens in Latin America
and the Caribbean think about militarizing public
security is germane and judicious. Governments
manage different economic, partisan, and social
determinants to shape security, and public
opinion is considered a significant factor that
influences decision-making regarding crime
and security.
This research should help distinguish drivers
and obstacles for democracy and human
rights currently blurred by state-centered
perspectives on security, peace, and the rule of
law. Such an agenda poses a series of related
questions. What is the “failure” of criminal
justice institutions saying, and how does it
affect the armed forces? What are the underlying
views of citizens toward the militarization of
public security? What effect do democracy
and the rule of law have on the support for
militarization? Offering a more inclusive and
society-centered perspective on militarism and
militarization should provide information on how
citizens demand development and peace, how
governments have responded to popular claims
for greater security, and finally, the complexity
and overlapping governance of public security
and defense.
The second section of the report will also
help expand our knowledge of militarism and
militarization informing security and defense
planners, specifically those preparing tailored
policies toward conflict and peace in the region.
It gives facts and data-driven analyses to those
running military programs with think-alike
partners in the region. The outcomes of this
research will also be a point of reference for
military officers traveling to the region, as well as
those completing postgraduate studies at war
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colleges and military universities. The practical
lessons of this research seek to aid in building
expertise and academic resources transferable
to local military and law enforcement officials
across the Western Hemisphere.

MILITARISM AND
MILITARIZATION
The term militarism is broadly defined as “the
intrusion of military considerations into the
process of political and diplomatic decisionmaking.”5 It is also referred to as adopting
military values, beliefs, and mentalities into
civilian daily life. Similar premises across the
social sciences argue that militarism promotes
martial, bellicose, and warrior-like attitudes
in educational, cultural, economic, and class
structures. Militarism pervades beliefs in many
democratic practices across daily rituals at
home, school, and the workplace.6 On the other
hand, militarization considers the processes
in which nations absorb and aspire to military
practices, modes of organization, and martial
discourses. Militarized speeches and attitudes
usually stand behind the growth of armies,
weapons stockpiles, states of national security,
and the overall integration of military images
and language to popular culture.7
While military historians have described
what militarism entails in the affairs of war,
imperialism, peace, and globalization,8 military
sociologists contributed to this agenda by
examining the social determinants of militarism
on crime, media, sexuality, and religion.9
Feminist and critical perspectives exhibited in
the works of Cynthia Enloe,10 Amina Mama and
Margo Okazawa-Rey,11 and Lynne Segal,12 offer
a great deal of knowledge on how race and
gender perspectives counter trauma, pain, and
bias as outcomes of militarism. Qualitatively,
the ability of the military to dominate and
influence government policies and social
organization has long been recognized in the
post-World War II era.13 Quantitatively, William
Eckhardt14 and Alan Newcombe15 laid fertile
ground to grasp the social attitudes affecting
militarism and militarization.16
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This report is a partial view of militarism as
there are too many cutting-edge theories about
gender, ethnicity, religion, crime, and human
rights that can help explain its current forms.
Despite the exponential growth in the field,
the sociological study of militarism has only
partially captured public attitudes in reflexive
and critical ways to inform policymakers. Many
militaristic processes combining war and peace
with military and civilian life are regarded as a
large-scale problem. Societies give different
meanings to the duties of the warrior class,
from preserving humanity’s security by enacting
liberal values to imposing national unity through
what some consider a perennial state of war
mobilization.17 Postmodern militarism and the
effects of militarization as organized state
violence are used today to “remedy” many social
phenomena, from educating the young and
vulnerable, countering transnational criminality,
and crushing mass street protests, to most
recently aiding in the fight against COVID-19.
Twenty-first century militarism has driven the
military to perform social and political tasks.
Against what others have predicted,18 the armed
forces remain highly connected to society
in various ways. In turn, the public retains its
confidence in the military.19 Such forms of
militarism demand a further explanation to
inform policymakers at all levels.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Due to a culture of global warfare expanding after
September 11, 2001, and heavily influenced
by the “American century,”20 militarism is said
to be profoundly affecting the ways civilians
and organized institutions deal with issues of
peace, security, crime, freedom, democracy,
and national unity.
The ad hoc forms of militarism and militarization
taking shape worldwide focus attention on the
cultural and attitudinal differences between
societal groups. Features of militarism still
constitute the foundations of social life –
symbols, language, culture, values, or national
identity. Philippe Frowd and Adam Sandor,
for example, find militarism “helpful for
efforts to understand the fetishization of the
state’s organized coercive capacities,” and
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give meaning to militarization “as a way of
grasping intervention practices’ shift toward
martial violence.”21 However, they claim that
both terms lack powerful explanations on how
“global and local actors avoid militarization,”
and how networks of actors and practices
compete to sustain and push back militarism
and militarization. West and Matthewman argue
that the sociology of war and the military is
better approached by overlapping relationships
between the military and civil society.22
Researchers should be mindful to focus
on “cases of cultural shifts in the direction
of militarism,” and “the multi-dimensional
ways that the military influences culture.”23
Anthropological approaches emphasize the
study of influences, attitudes, and ideologies
that explain militarism and warfare (e.g.,
defense expenditure, army size, training, and
civil-military relations) and show concern about
other factors such as ideals of masculinity and
nationalism, patriotism, and globalism.24
Ironically, militarism is regarded by some in
society and government as a solution to “restore”
peace and societal order.25 Nonetheless, stateorganized violence has been shown to reinforce
the brutal use of violence and systemic abuse
of individuals and their collective rights and
freedom. Sociological work regarding the debate
on militarism and its effects on peace, violence,
human rights, and genocide sheds light on the
perpetual militarization of those in power to
solve all-out war and civil conflict.26
In Africa, for example, Rita Abrahamsen
describes a scenario where an unquestioning
and “feel-good” attitude toward militarism
enshrines the armed forces’ influence in the
name of development and their role to fight
violent extremism.27 In Latin America and the
Middle East, the military has putative functions
in fighting crime, often adding more abuses and
violence, especially against the impoverished
urban classes.28 State agents (e.g., from the
police and the armed forces) have suppressed
crowds chanting for better living conditions.
In Europe, militarism in the above terms has
decelerated but has been exacerbated in
other ways. Shaw argued that the process of
demilitarization kicked in as countries reduced
their conscription, defense expenditures, and
most notably when societies became used

to living without mass-scale wars and the
intrusion of conflict and violence in domestic
life.29 Militarism across Western Europe may
no longer be about open or direct military rule
or the top military brass occupying a dominant
position of decision-making and power across
nations.30 Critics would argue that while
countries in Europe have steered away from
“military imperialism,” the United States, with its
massive military establishment, reaches every
corner of the world.31
Being the largest military power in the world raises
questions for decision-makers in the United
States and across the Western Hemisphere.
Particularly relevant for SOUTHCOM’s strategic
priorities32 evolving manifestations of militarism
in the Americas reveal ongoing shifts in the
broad national strategic scenario. The presence
of Russia and China points to countries putting
developmental and economic partnerships
first, thus trying to acquire valuable means to
maximize their developmental paths. Beijing
and Moscow are highly militaristic countries and
embrace diplomatic relations with the Americas
based on providing governments with economic
and security independence from Washington.
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the
U.S.-China and Russia divide as many countries
have opted for the resources provided by
Beijing and Moscow, most notably, acquiring
vast quantities of vaccines made in the two
countries to alleviate exhausted healthcare
systems.33 The COVID-19 militaristic response
across the region has involved the military,
who took an active role in delivering healthrelated services and security roles. In Brazil,
for example, militarized responses to the
pandemic (i.e., giving logistical responsibilities
to the armed forces) corroborated the ongoing,
extreme reliance on security forces to help the
government execute and deliver social policy,
although, under President Jair Bolsonaro, this
began well before the pandemic.34 In Chile, the
military had previously suppressed the estallido
social before turning to pandemic-related
humanitarian roles and enforcing lockdown
policies.35 In Colombia, the armed forces also
began supporting the police in urban areas
and neighborhoods and considerably restricted
individual liberties for long periods.36
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In Mexico and the Northern Triangle, the
pandemic exacerbated the ongoing trend of
criminal organizations gaining control over
communities, triggering governments to further
rely on the armed forces for combating crime
and violence.37 In Peru, governments called
for thousands of reserves to help enforce the
national emergency, control quarantines, and
aid in the flow of supply medical supply chains
across the heavily populated provinces.38 These
sorts of responses to COVID-19 are not unique
to Latin American and Caribbean nations.
Around the world, leaders have securitized and
declared war on COVID-19,39 thus making one
question what these and other current trends
on militarism mean for the legitimacy of public
institutions and the armed forces themselves.

MILITARISM IN THE AMERICAS
Militarism across parts of the Americas unfolds
in unique ways, driven partly by the economic
globalization of states (e.g., Brazil, Mexico,
and Colombia) navigating various budgetary
restrictions and other financial and politicalcultural processes from developing liberal
democracies.40 Since the end of the Cold War,
internationalized military responses have given
rise to a less intense but equally globalized
militarism (e.g., from conflict intervention and
peacekeeping operations in the Americas and
abroad to growing military links Russia and
China).41 Many forms of militarization remain
present, most notably in Venezuela and Brazil,
where military reform has failed.42 Examples
include the military-industrial complex, the
militarization of policing and intelligence
agencies, the use of military contractors,
the establishment of digital surveillance
programs, recent armed interventions in urban
contexts, and ongoing defensive and offensive
cybersecurity and defense policies.43 A. Coskun
Samli maintains that “accelerating militarism is
not likely to be beneficial to anybody with the
possible exception of a few global corporate
giants using globalization as a weapon to
increase their economic gains.”44
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Yet, across the geographic Americas, some
forms of militarization have decreased their rate
of progress. This trend goes toward diminishing
militaristic control over national resources and
the military’s overextended apparatus. Figure 1
shows a two-way graph with multiple y-axes.
The left axis indicates the military dimension
index measured by the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) project; the right axis shows military
expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic
product (GDP).45 At first sight, the extent to
which the power base of the chief executive is
determined by threat or force by the military has
decreased, most notably in Central America,
while the trend in South America has been
irregular but generally in a downward fashion.
This was not a problem until later in North
America, where scores are usually low but have
trended slightly upward since 2015.
Researchers have explored the link between
militarism and globalization, operationalizing
militarism by military expenditure, demonstrating
that countries undergoing greater globalization
have relatively large increases in militarization.46
Since 2009, military spending in Latin America
has shown a subtle but decreasing trend, after
an increasing trend started in 2003. Military
budgets as a proportion of gross domestic
product have fallen, with most countries scoring
below the 2 percent threshold except for the
Colombian armed forces receiving 3.2 percent
of the country’s GDP, well above the average 1.2
percent of GDP across the region.
Previous studies have operationalized militarism
as a quantifiable variable by measuring the
total percentage of soldiers in a population.47
For this purpose, Figure 2 shows the size of the
armed forces by personnel in selected world
regions. Like the trend captured in Graph 1,
the percentage of armed forces personnel as
a part of the total labor force in Latin America
and the Caribbean has remained steady since
the turn of the century, likewise South Asia. In
the European Union, East Asia and the Pacific,
North America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the
proportion of armed forces personnel has
decreased. The extreme case is Venezuela, with
military personnel accounting for 2.7 percent of
the total labor force.
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Another sign of reduced militarism is when
the population has little desire for armies
leading their countries if all else fails. Table
1 shows the responses of Latin Americans
regarding whether the armed forces should
take over when crime and corruption are
high. The percentages indicate that among
those countries scrutinized, both scenarios
are not supported by an average difference
of 10 percentage points in favor of those not
justifying military takeovers in 2004-2018.
The data above demonstrates the plausible
idea of austerity among armies, policymakers
pushing toward demilitarization, and, up to a
certain point, clearer boundaries between peace
and war mobilization. However, militarism, as
the ideology and belief that underlie militaristic
tendencies, and militarization as the process
by which militarism reaches civil society, have
affected attitudes predicting strong confidence
and support for national armies.
Graph 3 shows the levels of public trust in the
armed forces, the police, and citizen support for
the armed forces fighting crime and violence
in a selection of Latin American and Caribbean
countries. The scale in points (x-axis) is
common to the confidence measures and the
militarization of public security argument from
1 (no trust/strongly disagree) to 7 (a lot of trust/
strongly agree). The results show that in all
countries, confidence in the national police is
below the levels of trust in the armed forces.
Support for the idea of militarization of crime
and violence is, on the other hand, more firmly
supported with the largest levels of support in
El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic,
and Suriname.

FIGURE 1. MILITARY DIMENSION AND ARMED FORCES
EXPENDITURE

Source: Author’s creation with data from V-Dem Project and SIPRI.

FIGURE 2. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL IN SELECTED
WORLD REGIONS

Source: Author’s creation with data from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies.50

TABLE 1. COUP SUPPORT IN THE AMERICAS
Coup is Justified when Crime is High (%)
2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Total

Yes, a military takeover is justified

50.3

49.3

52.1

44

41.7

35.7

41.6

41.7

44.6

No, a military takeover is not
justified

49.7

50.7

47.9

56

58.3

64.3

58.4

58.3

55.4

Yes, a military takeover is justified

51.9

45

47.9

43

40.3

42.7

40

40

44.1

No, a military takeover is not
justified

48.1

55

52.1

57

59.7

57.3

60

60

55.9

Coup is Justified when Corruption is High (%)

Source: Author’s creation with data from the The Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer various rounds.51
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FIGURE 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIZATION
OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note and source: Observations indicate mean values. The militarization question
used above was added to the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.52

FIGURE 4. FREQUENCY IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD OF
THE POLICE OR MILITARY INTERFERING WITH PEOPLE’S
PRIVATE LIVES IN PERCENTAGES

Notes: Values recorded from 2017 through 2020.
Source: Created by author with data from World Values Survey.53

FIGURE 5. SATISFACTION WITH POLICE PERFORMANCE
IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Source: Author’s creation with data from AmericasBarometer. The above
question was used in the 2014 round of the survey.54
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The relatively strong support for the militarization
of public security in Latin America comes at a
point when the role of the police and the military
in people’s private lives seems to be increasing.
Figure 4 shows worldwide levels of security
agents’ interference in people’s neighborhoods
interrupting their daily activities. From the
global sample, countries such as Argentina,
Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile show some
of the highest percentages of the frequency in
which the police or military interfere with private
life, although in other countries, the percentages
are quite low (e.g., Bolivia and Peru).
Against this background, evaluations of police
performance at the local level generally show
different perceptions and lesser or greater
satisfaction with police performance. Figure
5 shows the constants of countries where a
majority of the population is satisfied versus
those in which most are unsatisfied with the
police’s performance in their neighborhood.
Despite such evidence, it is challenging to
visualize common patterns since some countries
have been plagued by crime and violence,
police corruption, and “tough on crime” policies.
However, satisfaction with the police remains
visible despite violent crimes and homicides
escalating to unparalleled levels (e.g., El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, among others). Finally,
greater percentages of police performance
satisfaction are seen in the Caribbean (e.g.,
Suriname, the Bahamas, and Barbados).
Although official statistics in the region do not
always indicate the “true” scale of crime, the
miscarriages of the criminal justice system and
the agencies in it (police, prosecutors, courts,
prisons, among others) have had a cumulative
effect on the reported victims of crime and
violence and the non-victims who witnessed
failures in the procedural and substantive nature
of criminal justice. Table 2 shows confidence
levels in the outcomes of justice in select Latin
American and Caribbean countries across
different rounds of the AmericasBarometer
public opinion survey. At first glance, some
exemplary countries where the militarization of
public security has ignited recent debates seem
to have populations with little confidence that
the judiciary will punish the guilty. As mentioned
earlier, there is less satisfaction with police
performance in Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and
Guatemala, among other countries.
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TABLE 2. CONFIDENCE THAT THE JUDICIARY WILL
PUNISH THE GUILTY
A lot +
Some (%)

Little +
None (%)

Total (%)

Year

Mexico

26.2

73.8

100 (N= 1546)

2019

Peru

28.1

71.9

100 (N= 1,509)

2019

Paraguay

28.2

71.8

100 (N= 1,509)

2019

Colombia

32.4

67.6

100 (N= 1,651)

2018

El Salvador

33.3

66.7

100 (N= 1,458)

2018

Guatemala

35.6

64.4

100 (N= 1,513)

2019

Belize

39.2

60.8

100 (N= 1,511)

2014

Guyana

40.6

59.3

100 (N= 1,488)

2014

Trinidad and
Tobago

42.4

57.6

100 (N=4,072)

2014

Honduras

44.5

55.4

100 (N= 1,496)

2018

Dominican
Republic

44.7

55.3

100 (N= 1,196)

2019

Nicaragua

50.3

47.6

100 (N= 1,510)

2019

Jamaica

50.5

49.5

100 (N= 1,394)

2019

Ecuador

52.2

47.8

100 (N= 1,517)

2016

Bahamas

54.9

45.1

100 (N= 3,332)

2014

Barbados

63.8

36.2

100 (N= 3,633)

2014

Suriname

75.2

24.8

100 (N= 3,661)

2014

Note and source: The question used above comes in country-specific surveys in
different rounds of the AmericasBarometer.55

MACRO INDICATORS
CORRELATED TO
MILITARIZATION
In this section, five questions are posited and
answered. First, is support for the militarization
of security correlated to liberal democracy
scores? If so, is there a positive or negative
correlation? Second, is support for the
militarization of crime and violence correlated
to the rule of law? That is, is this a positive
or negative association? Third, is support for
the militarization of crime and violence linked
to state fragility measures? For instance, while

views on militarization progress or regress,
what happens to measures on state fragility?
Fourth, can support for the militarization
of crime and violence be linked to higher
levels of military expenditure? If so, is this a
statistically significant association? Fifth, what
is the correlation between supporting the
militarization of crime and violence and the
level of armed forces personnel? That is, while
views on militarization are high or low, what
is the degree of association with active-duty
military personnel?
A few initial ideas can be understood by
reviewing the descriptive statistics of what
hereafter are the variables measuring the above
questions. From Table 1, the sample of countries
(N =18) in the study has a means of support for
the militarization of crime and violence of 5.38
in a Likert Scale in which 1 is the lowest score,
meaning strong disagreement, and 7 is the
highest score, a firm agreement with the idea that
the military should combat crime and violence.
Scores in this measure range from a minimum
of 4.48 in Uruguay to a maximum of 5.98 in El
Salvador. One initial interpretation is that people
in the countries surveyed welcome the idea that
the armed forces should battle crime. This is
understood by dividing the range of answers into
two halves (from 1 to 3.5, meaning not agreeing
to militarize public security, and from 3.6 to 7,
agreeing to militarize it). Because the original
scale is continuous, it should be treated as a
continuum of preferences for an Ordinary Least
Squares regression later in the analysis.56
The next item to account for is the liberal
democracy index brought into question to
measure whether there is a correlation with the
militarization variable. Here, the scores from
the 2020 dataset of the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) project correspond to each of the
countries sampled.57 A brief explanation of how
this measure works will be presented shortly
with a series of scatterplots with overlaid
linear prediction plots. For now, there is an
assumption that the liberal democracy score
runs from 0 being the lowest to 1 being the
greatest extent of what the ideal of liberal
democracy achieves. Countries scored a mean
of .48, with the lowest being Nicaragua (.06)
and the highest Uruguay (.79).

11

Next, a measure of the rule of law was also
taken from the V-Dem project dataset for 2020.
In similar fashion to the previous indicator,
this measure runs from 0 to 1. In Table 1, the
sample scored a mean of .50, with the lowest
score assigned again to Nicaragua and the
highest to Uruguay.
The state fragility index covers a wide range of
failure risk elements and, thus, complements
the previous two measures on macro indicators.
This measure runs contrary to expectations
from 0 to 120, the latter indicating the worst
situated country. The sample of countries in this
analysis has a mean score of 63.5, with Uruguay
scoring 33.4 points and Guatemala 79.2 points,
the worst score in the sample.
Finally, there are two proxy measures of
contemporary militarization elements a country
can portray: the proportion of its military
expenditure and the size of its active-duty
military personnel. Both measures are captured
as percentages, the former as a proportion of
gross domestic product (GDP) and the latter
as a proportion of the economically active
population. Table 3 shows that countries
spend a minimum of 0.4 percent of their GDP
on military expenditure, as in the case of
Guatemala, all the way to 3.2 percent of GDP
in Colombia. Regarding armed personnel, the
lowest proportions of active-duty personnel are
0.4 percent (Barbados, Jamaica, and Nicaragua)
and the highest is 1.8 percent of the total labor
force (Colombia).

TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Militarization

18

5.38

.41

4.48

5.98

Liberal
Democracy
Score

16

.481

.19

.06

.79

Rule of Law

16

.508

0.51

.25

.93

State Fragility

18

63.5

12.1

33.4

79.2

Military
Expenditure

15

1.28

0.71

.4

3.2

Armed
Personnel

18

.85

0.41

.4

1.8

Sources: Authors’ construction with data from AmericasBarometer, V-Dem
Project, SIPRI, IISS, and the Fragile State Index.58
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From the information provided in Table 3, there
is no empirically informed answer to whether
the set of variables indicated are correlated
in any way to the militarization argument. For
that, there is a series of scatterplots with an
overlaid linear prediction plot. Figure 4, for
example, shows the relationship between the
mean scores of whether the armed forces
should combat crime and violence (hereafter,
the militarization variable) with the liberal
democracy scores. The extent to which the ideal
of the liberal democracy model is achieved is a
simplified measure of the quality of democracy
by the limits placed on government (i.e., to what
length is the exercise of executive power limited
via constitutional civil liberties, the rule of law,
an independent judiciary, and effective checks
and balances).59
From Figure 4, there is a partial answer to
whether support for the militarization of
security is correlated to liberal democracy
scores and if it is a positive or negative
association. The line of best fit shown in red
depicts a negative association meaning that
when the militarization variable is high, liberal
democracy scores are low. Because the liberal
democracy score had a mean of 0.48, there
is an assumption that some countries scored
below and above this mark, and to the left and
right of the militarization axis.
If the focus is on the countries scoring above
or below the mean values for the militarization
variable, the mean value was 5.38. Although
it is not this paper’s intention to explore each
country’s contexts in detail, at least two groups
become visually identifiable using the mean’s
values as cutting points: Those scoring high in
militarization and low in liberal democracy (e.g.,
Brazil, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and
Honduras) and those scoring low in militarization
and high in liberal democracy (e.g., Peru, Jamaica,
and Suriname).60 The full picture is revealed
when looking at the correlation values shown
in Table 2. Thus, the liberal democracy scores
are negatively and statistically significant to the
militarization variable (Pearson coefficient is
moderate at r = -.61, p < .05).
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TABLE 4. CORRELATION ESTIMATES
Armed
Forces
Should
Combat

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Crime and
Violence

18

5.38

.41

4.48

5.98

Liberal
Democracy
Score

-0.61*

.481

.19

.06

.79

Rule of Law

-0.70*

.508

0.51

.25

.93

State Fragility

0.655*

63.5

12.1

33.4

79.2

Military
Expenditure

-0.24

1.28

0.71

.4

3.2

Armed
Personnel

0.02

.85

0.41

.4

1.8

Note: * correlation coefficients significant at the 5 percent level or better

FIGURE 6. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY SCORES AND SUPPORT
FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer and V-Dem Project.61

FIGURE 7. RULE OF LAW AND SUPPORT FOR THE
MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer and V-Dem Project.63

The same exercise uncovers the association
between the rule of law and support for the
militarization of crime and violence. Figure 5
shows a two-way linear prediction plot with
the V-Dem project variable measuring the rule
of law on the y-axis. The rule of law predictor
measures a series of elements, including: the
independence of the judiciary; the extent to
which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal
matters; the existence of direct civil control
over the police; the protection from political
terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, and
torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and
the extent to which laws, policies, and practices
guarantee equal treatment of various segments
of the population.62
In Figure 5, most countries are in the lower right
quadrant, where the lesser levels of the rule of
law and higher levels of militarization meet. As
exceptions, only Uruguay and Barbados show
values greater than the mean of the rule of law
and values lower than the mean of militarization.
On the other hand, Trinidad and Tobago indicate
lower levels of the rule of law and low levels of
militarization, using the means for both measures
as cutting points. The line of best fit shows a
negative direction of the association between
both variables, and the Pearson correlation
estimate in Table 2 indicates a moderate to
strong correlation (r = -.70, p < .05).
Next is the study of the relationships between
state fragility and support for the militarization
of crime and violence. The State Fragility Index
ranks states’ risk elements including the loss of
physical control of territory or a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate
authority to make collective decisions, the
inability to provide reasonable public services,
and the inability to interact with other states as
a full member of the international community.64
Figure 6 shows a two-way linear prediction plot
with the state fragility variable on the y-axis
and the militarization variable on the x-axis. The
line of best fit shows a sharp ascending straight
line indicating a possible positive relationship
between the two variables. In Table 2, the
correlation is positive and moderate (r = .65, p
< .05). The higher the score in the state fragility
index, the higher a country’s risk elements are
perceived. The sample of countries is, as Figure
6 suggests, highly concentrated in the quadrant
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of high state fragility and high militarization,
except for Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the
Bahamas, and Uruguay. Thus, according to the
measures considered in the study, support for
the militarization of crime and violence is linked
to state fragility measures.

FIGURE 8. STATE FRAGILITY INDEX AND SUPPORT FOR
THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer and Fragile States Index.65

Finally, two elements concerning militarization
are contrasted: military expenditure and the
proportion of armed personnel. The results of
the Pearson correlation in Table 2 show that
neither of these two measures is statistically
significant to the militarization variable.
Nonetheless, in Figure 7, countries with a higher
mean perception that the armed forces should
combat crime and violence tend to budget for
military spending below 2 percent of the GDP
benchmark. The only exception is Colombia,
with a military expenditure of 3.2 percent of
GDP, well above that of the rest of the sample.
Figure 8 shows two different cases presented
when exploring the relationship between
armed forces personnel as a proportion of
total labor force and militarization. On the one
hand, Uruguay shows the lower mean for the
militarization variables, although its activeduty personnel size is comparable to countries
at the higher end of militarization, such as the
Dominican Republic and El Salvador. From the
analyzed sample, there is no support to argue
that the militarization of crime and violence is
linked to higher levels of military expenditure or
a higher proportion of armed forces personnel.

FIGURE 9. MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND SUPPORT FOR
THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

FIGURE 10. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL AND SUPPORT
FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Note: Line of best fit shown in red.
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer round 2014 and SIPRI.66

Note: Line of best fit is shown in red.
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer round 2014 and IISS.67
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PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
MILITARIZATION: HONDURAS,
MEXICO, AND URUGUAY
In this section, case studies of Honduras, Mexico,
and Uruguay examine key socioeconomic
and political beliefs potentially linked to one
person’s support for the militarization of crime
and violence. Linear regression is modeled
predicting associations between a continuous
dependent variable and a set of independent
variables. These three countries are used based
on their different mean scores for what hereafter
will be the dependent variable or “whether
the armed forces should combat crime and
violence” as included in the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer (i.e., militarization variable).
Honduras scored the highest mean (5.89), and
Uruguay the lowest (4.48). It could be presumed
that countries with different outcomes in
their population’s perception of militarization
could provide an array of explanations on the
association of the dependent variable with the
selected independent variables.
A second evidence-based reason, and the
strongest case to include Mexico (mean of
militarization = 5.57) as a third case study, is
to present countries with varied constitutional
roles and missions given to the military in
the fight against crime and violence. Other
methodologies of case selection could have
emphasized different elements, thus being
representative of other subsets of countries
different from the ones identified. However,
these cases were chosen to provide a workable
analysis capturing different base conditions that
trigger the same response: the militarization of
public security.
In Honduras, the military joined other
constabulary forces to create military police
units. This condition is seen in other countries
where the armed forces are currently an active
player among a web of crime-fighting institutions
(e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, and Bolivia). Since
the 2013 formation of the Military Police of
Public Order (Policía Militar del Orden Público or
PMOP), there has been an increase in budgets
given to the Secretariat of National Defense
(Secretaría de Defensa Nacional) to implement
broader roles and missions of public security

across Honduras.68 Like other countries where
the armed forces now command missions that
often supersede paramilitary agencies dealing
with policing and crime (e.g., Brazil, Colombia,
and Venezuela), the Mexican military executes
and takes a leading role in essential matters
once performed by federal or local police and
civilian agencies.69 On the other hand, Uruguay
is a country where a revamped legal framework
allows it to focus on targeted missions, most
likely against transnational organized crime
(e.g., Argentina and Chile).70 The Uruguayan
military has limited roles in contrast to Honduras
and Mexico (i.e., patrolling the border up to 20
kilometers inside its territory, except for urban
areas). By law, it can run identification checks
on people and vehicles and arrest in cases of
flagrant crimes.
This paper hypothesizes that demographic
factors will reveal different degrees of association
with support toward militarization. Because
militarism exacerbates gender inequalities
replicating masculine and patriarchal features,71
males are more likely to support militarization
than females (H1) based on the idea that women
can perceive the military and militarism as
hyper-masculinized institutions.72 Those living
in urban areas (H2) are more likely to support
the current phenomena of militarizing public
security, as criminality and violence have had
a more significant impact in bigger cities and
peripheral urban areas with larger pockets of
inequality.73 Militarization also occurs in rural
zones where other security problems have
demanded traditional and non-traditional
military approaches to fight organized crime
linked to guerrillas and private paramilitary
forces. For the sake of simplicity, this study will
test the former idea only.
The following hypothesis argues that the fewer
years of education completed, the more likely
individuals are to support the militarization of
security (H3). The link between the militarization
of schools and the education of teenagers has
been widely researched.74 Youth are confronted
with a “web of militarism,” ranging from military
recruiters visiting schools and paramilitary
programs to career guidance promoting the
armed forces,75 making them more suited to
support militarism and militarization. Previous
research has emphasized that some military
ethos initiatives usually target boys and girls
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from disadvantaged backgrounds to make
them “economically and socially productive,”
educating and socializing them through military
service.76 Another hypothesis is that household
income will be negatively associated with
militarization (H4). This hypothesis is based
on evidence that the military has covered
institutional gaps and structural deficits when
governments fail to implement social policy,
subsequently affecting the lower and most
vulnerable classes.77
Those trusting the military will also be more
likely to support militarization (H5). Because
war, peace, soldiers, and the military institution
pervade public consciousness, citizens might
tacitly endorse the armed forces and support the
militarization of public security as intertwined
and indistinguishable phenomena.78 On the other
hand, those not trusting the police are more
likely to support militarization (H6) because the
militarization of crime is an outcome of the failure
of the police to provide peace and security. The
military is regarded as different from the police,
having greater confidence from the public than
criminal justice and political institutions.79
Moreover, perceptions and experiences with
insecurity can predict support for militarization
among the public. First, victims of crime
(H7) and those believing gangs affect their
neighborhoods (H8) are more likely to support
the militarization of crime. On the contrary,
those who have been asked for a bribe (H9),
specifically from a soldier or military, will not
support militarizing public security.
Another set of related variables measures
different attributes of the military as an
organization. Those believing the armed forces
are well trained (H10) and respect human rights
(H11) are more likely to support militarization.
In addition, individuals who think the United
States should work with their national armies to
improve national security (H12) are more likely
to see some form of partnership capitalizing on
the militarization of public security.
Finally, a positive relationship between those
favoring coups when crime (H13) and corruption
(H14) proliferate is more likely to support the
militarization of public security. Pro-militarism
and militarization attitudes will be associated
positively with individuals who self-identify with
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authoritarian views. Historically, militarism has
been related to advocating a militarized foreign
policy and authoritarian forms of domestic
control as the antithesis of progressive politics.80
Those disappointed with democratically elected
civilians will support militarization as a dominant
force capable of solving crime and violence in
a way that democratic institutions have been
incapable of doing.81
Table 5 shows the coefficients of a linear
regression model using militarization variables
as the outcome.82 The first set of variables are
used as controls and include gender, place
of residence, years of schooling, and monthly
household income (see Appendix Table A1 for
the variables used in the analysis and their
recodification, and Table A2 for the variables
summary statistics).
First, the results indicate that living in urban
areas (ß = .21, p <. 05) compared to rural zones
and higher household income are positively
and statistically significant with the view that
the armed forces should combat crime in
Honduras, but not in Mexico or Uruguay. Another
statistically important control variable is years
of schooling, which is negatively associated
with support for militarization in Uruguay.
Second, the following two variables assume
support for political institutions. Here, the
consideration is whether trust in the national
police and the armed forces are significant
predictors of militarization. The results suggest
that trust in the police is negatively and
statistically considerable with the militarization
variable in Uruguay, and support for the armed
forces is positively and statistically significant
in Uruguay and Mexico. This is an expected but
revealing finding for Uruguay. The results suggest
that citizens prefer the military and support
militarization (although, as mentioned before, to
a lesser degree than in the other two countries).
Third, the model measuring victimization, gang
presence, whether a soldier requested a bribe
to account for individual experiences, and
perceptions of insecurity included a subgroup
of three variables. Surprisingly, none of the
predictors turned out to be statistically significant
toward explaining the militarization outcome.

Militarism and the Militarization of Public Security in Latin America and the Caribbean

TABLE 5. LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD
COMBAT CRIME AND VIOLENCE
DV: Militarization

Honduras

Mexico

Uruguay

Gender

0.098
(0.082)

-0.033
(0.117)

-0.058
(0.1170

Residence

0.216*
(0.092)

0.068
(0.2310

-0.343
(0.231)

Education

-0.013
(0.011)

0.004***
(0.016)

-0.066***
(0.016)

0.034***
(0.011)

-0.017
(0.013)

0.009
(0.013)

Trust in police

-0.019
(0.024)

-0.039***
(0.036)

-0.138***
(0.036)

Trust in military

0.034
(0.026)

0.218***
(0.038)

0.280***
(0.038)

Victim of crime

0.076
(0.027)

0.143
(0.137)

0.129
(0.1370

Gangs in neighborhood

0.001
(0.109)

-0.138
(0.130)

0.166
(0.130)

Soldier requested bribe

0.297
(0.182)

0.379
(1.869)

0.942
(1.869)

Military is well organized
and trained

0.135***
(0.028)

-

-

Military respects human
rights

0.029
(0.027)

0.134
(0.040)

0.059
(0.040)

Military should work with
the U.S.

0.206***
(0.025)

0.099***
(0.028)

0.278***
(0.028)

Coup is justified when
crime is high

0.098
(0.109)

0.248
(0.193)

0.403*
(0.193)

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

0.074
(0.102)

0.235***
(0.188)

0.805***
(0.188)

3.409***
(0.201)

3.471***
(0.352)

3.084***
(0.352)

.14
1246

.17
947

.34
1096

Income

Constant
Adj R-squared N

Note: Regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses. * p < .05, * p
< .01, * p < .001
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer.

Fourth, three variables related to the roles and
missions of the armed forces were included
to predict perceptions of preparedness and
organization, respect for human rights, and
cooperation with the United States. Only
Honduran citizens were asked whether the armed
forces were well trained and organized, which
eventually became a statistically significant
predictor of support for militarization. Mexicans
believing the armed forces respect human rights
are also willing to support the militarization of
public security, but not citizens from Honduras
or Uruguay. Finally, another unanticipated result
is that in Honduras (ß = .20, p <. 05), Mexico (ß
= .09, p <. 05), and Uruguay (ß = .28, p <. 05),
cooperation with the U.S. military on security
issues is positively and statistically correlated
with militarization.
Fifth, the model included two variables asking
citizens whether they support military coups.
It turns out citizens supporting a military
takeover in conditions of high crime and high
corruption were statistically significant with the
militarization variable in Mexico and Uruguay.

CONCLUSION
This report was written from a military sociology
point of view aimed at scholars and policy officials
with a multidisciplinary background and growing
interest in exploring the intended and unintended
effects of militarism and militarization in the
Americas. The paper introduced critical theories of
militarism understood as the way societies adopt
martial, bellicose, and warrior-like attitudes to
deal with daily problems. This paper also explored
the notion that militaristic approaches capture
decision-making processes by examining military
missions and roles and the militarization of nonarmy institutions such as the police.
For policy purposes, the report concentrated
on regional issues of pressing importance,
including conflict, social inequality, and
violence, to understand why some argue we live
under a perennial state of war mobilization and
growing criminalization of human conduct. As
scholars have contended, recent events around
the world, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
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terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the global financial
crash, shed light on militarism affecting lay
citizens and organized institutions.84
The paper reported on new empirical links
considering militaristic attitudes perceived by the
public and informed by whether it thinks one of
the roles of the military is to keep or re-establish
peace in their countries. Theoretically, militaristic
attitudes recreate the fundamental link between
armies and conflict, establishing an “other,”
different from the “self,” deemed the enemy of
peace. Authors including Horace Campbell,85
Michael Mann,86 and Jacqui True87 agree that the
idea of a world becoming less prosperous and
more violent reinforces societal symbols based
on military preparation for war and perpetual
dominance of a militarized peace. The “other”
is usually constructed by exacerbating features
that criminals and those affecting peace through
the means of violence can portray.88
Attitudes toward militarism give the armed
forces the role of defending values, such as
freedom and democracy, which justify, prioritize,
and sustain military influence to deter perceived
threats such as criminality. Militarization is,
among other things, the extension in time and
place of the functions of the military. Such roles
are often beyond the scope of the institution.
However, from humanitarian aid to securing
voting stations, postmodern missions ultimately
portray an image of security, protection,
bonding, family, kinship, and the unification of
humans beyond military bases.89
This report explores militarism via various macro
factors, including democratic consolidation. For
example, in some parts of Europe, militarism
is regarded as incongruent with democracy
after the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth
century.90 A look at history since the creation
of armies has proven that mass armies become
“instrument[s] of usurpation and tyranny at
home, and of oppression abroad.” Liberals
learned that their self-imposed “democratic
practices” unintendedly resulted in the further
militarization of society, most notably making
conscription and military values “authentic”
manifestations of civil society.91
In Latin America and the Caribbean, nations
maintaining militarized societies might see
militarism go unchallenged, and even worse,
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turned against the people’s will, especially
if the ruling elites are disconnected from
the interest and sympathies of the general
populace. Still, there is hope if large, influential,
and powerful organizations such as the U.S.
defense establishment starts questioning
what militarism and militarization mean and
consequently discuss – at the highest levels of
policy-making – how militarism affects society,
violence outside armed conflict, criminality,
human rights, and environmental protection.
This paper sets the ground for such debate.

APPENDIX

TABLE A2. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable

Variables

Recodification

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Min-Max

Militarization

1557

5.89

1.50

1–7

Gender

1561

.50

.50

0–1

Residence

1561

.54

.49

0–1

Education

1559

7.40

5.33

0 – 18

DV:
Militarization

The Armed Forces ought to participate in combating
crime and violence. How much do you agree or disagree?
1 (min) to 7 (max)

Gender

0 = female; 1 = male

Residence

0 = female; 1 = male

Education

How many years of schooling have you completed?
0 (min) to 18 (max)

Income

1430

6.14

4.51

0 – 16

Into which of the following income ranges does the
total monthly income of this household fit, including
remittances from abroad and the income of all the
working adults and children? 0 (min) to 16 (max)

Trust in police

1555

3.80

1.94

1–7

Household
Income

Trust in military

1549

4.84

1.94

1–7

Victim of crime

1558

.18

.38

0–1

Institutional
confidence
Police

To what extent do you trust the National Police? 1 (Not at
all) to 7 (A lot)

Gangs in neighborhood

1539

.19

.38

0–1

Armed Forces

To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? 1 (Not at
all) to 7 (A lot)

Soldier requested bribe

1560

.06

.22

0–1

Military is well
organized and trained

1524

5.03

1.78

1–7

Military respects
human rights

1525

4.13

1.80

1–7

Military should work
with the U.S.

1537

5.72

1.75

1–7

Coup is justified when
crime is high

1465

.31

.46

0–1

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

1472

.41

.49

0–1

Security

Victim of
crime

Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past
12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery,
burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent
threats, or any other type of crime? 0 = no; 1 = yes

Gangs

To what extent do you think your neighborhood is
affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a
little or none? 0 = not at all or a little; 1 = some or a lot

Bribe

In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military
officer ask you for a bribe? 0 = no, 1 = yes

Military
Training and
organization

To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces are
well trained and organized? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)

Human rights

To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces
respect human rights nowadays? 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot)

Work with the
United States

To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of
the United States of America ought to work together with
the Armed Forces to improve national security? 1 (Not at
all) to 7 (A lot)

Coups

Some people say that under some circumstances it
would be justified for the military of this country to take
power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion
would it be justified under the following circumstances.

Against crime

When there is a lot of crime. 0 = no, 1 = yes

Against
corruption

When there is a lot of corruption. 0 = no, 1 = yes

TABLE A1. VARIABLES AND THEIR RECODIFICATION FOR
MODEL IN FIGURE 9
Source: Author’s construction with data from the 2014 round of the
AmericasBarometer.92
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Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Min-Max

Militarization

1507

5.57

1.61

1–7

Gender

1535

.49

.50

Residence

1535

.80

Education

1533

Income

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Min-Max

Militarization

1489

4.48

2.26

1–7

0–1

Gender

1512

.47

.49

0–1

.39

0–1

Residence

1512

.93

.24

0–1

9.19

4.38

0 – 18

Education

1511

9.69

4.00

0 – 18

1168

8.56

4.03

0 – 16

Income

1397

9.86

4.73

0 – 16

Trust in police

1527

3.33

1.82

1–7

Trust in police

1502

4.22

1.82

1–7

Trust in military

1494

5.01

1.72

1–7

Trust in military

1395

4.24

1.98

1–7

Victim of crime

1530

.23

.42

0–1

Victim of crime

1511

.22

.42

0–1

Gangs in neighborhood

1511

.34

.47

0–1

Gangs in neighborhood

1480

.26

.44

0–1

Soldier requested bribe

1520

.013

.11

0–1

Soldier requested bribe

1512

.001

.025

0–1

Military respects
human rights

1461

4.26

1.74

1–7

Military respects
human rights

1374

4.70

1.74

1–7

Military should work
with the U.S.

1450

4.56

2.15

1–7

Military should work
with the U.S.

1368

3.22

2.29

1–7

Coup is justified when
crime is high

1410

.47

.49

0–1

Coup is justified when
crime is high

1469

.26

.43

0–1

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

1407

.52

.49

0–1

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

1461

.29

.45

0–1

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

1472

.41

.49

0–1

Coup is justified when
corruption is high

1472

.41

.49

0–1

MEXICO

URUGUAY
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